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Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by Persons
Opting Out of a Class Action
by -Roger Furman *
The drafters of the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure' sought generally to maximize the binding effect of class ac-
tion judgments. 2 In deference to the fundamental right of individuals
to bring suit in their own behalf, however, the drafters created the opt-
out provision, which allows members of a common-question class to
exclude themselves from the action.3
In the event of a judgment favorable to the class,4 the person who
has opted out might bring an individual suit and seek to assert collat-
eral estoppel against the losing class opponent. In such a situation, the
general goal of maximizing the binding effect of class suits comes into
* B.A., 1977, Yale University. Member, Second Year Class.
I. This Note deals almost exclusively with federal materials. Since many state class
action rules emulate federal Rule 23, the conclusions reached herein may have validity in
the state context. See generally Homberger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71
COLuM. L. REV. 609 (1971); Developments in the Lan--Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1318, 1328 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
2. See Advisory Committee Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105-06 (1966). See also 7A C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1789, at 177 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]; Developments, supra note I, at 1393.
3. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2) provides: "In any class action maintained
under subdivision (b)(3) [governing common question actions brought on behalf of a class],
the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the cir-
cumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through rea-
sonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him
from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or
not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does
not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel." FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
4. If the judgment were adverse to the class, the opting-out party would be shielded in
several ways from the effect of that judgment. As provided in Rule 23(c)(2), the person is
not included in the judgment. Thus, in a later suit the individual cannot be bound by the
operation of res judicata, which applies only to those who are "parties and privies" to the
original action. See generally lB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.411 (2d ed. rev. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as MooRE's]. Nor will the individual be bound by the principles of collat-
eral estoppel; any adverse use of collateral estoppel against one not previously a party would
deprive that individual of his or her due process right to a day in court. See Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971) (dic-
tum); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). But see note 105 infra on the possibility of using
collateral estoppel against nonparties.
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conflict with the specific exclusionary policies underlying the opt-out
procedure. To date, analysis of the binding effect of class action judg-
ments has focused primarily on resolving the tension between these two
policies of Rule 23. An accurate critique, however, requires considera-
tion of the policies underlying collateral estoppel and their interplay
with the goals of the class device.
As a result of the steady decline of the doctrine of mutuality of
estoppel, nonparties have employed collateral estoppel successfully on
an increasingly large number of occasions to preclude relitigation of
issues. 5 In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,6 the United States Supreme
Court approved the most controversial of these uses: the Court permit-
ted a nonparty to assert collateral estoppel offensively. By precluding
the defendant from relitigating an issue decided in an action brought
earlier against that defendant by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC), the Court allowed the plaintiff to establish an element of a
claim for affirmative relief.7
Parklane thus may open the door for individuals who have opted
out of a class action to employ collateral estoppel offensively in a later
suit against the losing class opponent.8 In analyzing that possibility,
this Note first reviews the policies behind the federal courts' gradual
abandonment of mutuality of estoppel, which culminated in Parklane.
It then applies Parklane's standards for offensive use of collateral es-
toppel to the class action context. In most cases the arguments against
5. See, e.g., Oldham v. Pritchett, 599 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1979); Aiello v. City of Wil-
mington, 470 F. Supp. 414 (D. Del. 1979); Hann v. Carson, 462 F. Supp. 854 (M.D. Fla.
1978); Wolfson v. Baker, 444 F. Supp. 1124 (M.D. Fla. 1978); Capital Investments, Inc. v.
Bank of Sturgeon Bay, 430 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Crutsinger v. Hess, 408 F. Supp.
548 (D. Kan. 1976); McCook v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 393 F. Supp. 256 (C.D. Cal.
1975); Skrzat v. Ford Motor Co., 389 F. Supp. 753 (D.R.I. 1975). For cases prior to 1974, see
Note, Class Action Judgments and Mutuality of Estoppel, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 814, 819
n.28 (1975). See also IB MOORE'S, supra, note 4 at 0.412[11]. For the classic case involving
the mutuality principle, see Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 126-27
(1912). See also notes 15-17 & accompanying text infra.
6. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
7. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d
1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
8. This Note considers persons who opt out only of plaintiff class actions, which com-
prise the vast majority of class suits. See Note, Defendant Class Actions, 91 HARV. L. REV.
630, 630 (1978). In defendant class actions, the relief sought often is declaratory or injunc-
tive. See Wolfson, Defendant Class Actions, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 457, 457 (1977). Thus, most
defendant suits do not fall into the 23(b)(3) category, in which monetary relief usually is
sought. Because the opportunity to opt out exists solely in 23(b)(3) suits, most defendant
class actions will not involve opting out. Similarly, offensive use of collateral estoppel usu-
ally involves parties who would have been aligned with plaintiffs in the first action. A party
who opts out, in most such collateral estoppel situations, thus would have been a member of
a plaintiff class in the first suit. For a discussion of defendant class actions, see generally, id.,
at 457; Note, Defendant Class Actions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1978).
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allowing opt-out parties to use collateral estoppel offensively prove to
be strong. This analysis, however, reveals one exceptional situation in
which the courts should allow offensive assertion of collateral estoppel:
when the person opting out holds such a strong individual interest in
controlling his or her litigation that he or she would opt out irrespective
of any collateral estoppel rights.
The final section of the Note critically examines the advisability of
employing collateral estoppel offensively from the perspective of class
action policies. Two major criticisms emerge: the danger that all class
members might opt out, choosing to await the outcome of the original
suit;9 and the fear that offensive use would restore a form of one-way
intervention,10 a practice amended Rule 23 sought to abolish.1' De-
spite these criticisms, the Note concludes that allowing offensive use in
instances in which a strong individual interest is present would neither
make a mockery of amended Rule 2312 nor frustrate the policies of
collateral estoppel. Instead, the practice would maximize the binding
effect of favorable class judgments-a major aim of Rule 2313-without
diminishing the binding effect of adverse judgments. Offensive use in
this situation also would promote judicial economy in the later suit, one
of the principal goals of modem collateral estoppel.14
Development of Modern Collateral Estoppel
Mutuality of estoppel limits the collateral estoppel effect of a judg-
ment to original parties and privies. 15 It is a principle of symmetry
between original and later parties: when mutuality is required, "unless
both parties are bound by a prior judgment, neither may use the prior
9. See, e.g., Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassifed, 51 VA. L. REV. 629,
652-54 n.69 (1965).
10. See C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 314 (2d ed. 1970); 7A WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 2, § 1789, at 183-84; Cohn, The New FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 54
GEO. L.J. 1204, 1225 n.88 (1966); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee. 1966
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 391 n.136
(1967). See also note 113 infra.
11. "Under proposed subdivision (c)(2), one-way intervention is excluded." Advisory
Committee Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 106 (1966).
12. 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 1789, at 183-84: "Moreover, it [permitting
collateral estoppel by opting-out parties] would make a mockery of the notice and opting out
procedure in Rule 23(c)(2). Notions of collateral estoppel are not so inexorable that a party
who has affirmatively sought exclusion from a judgment later will be allowed to rely on it."
13. See authorities cited note 2 supra.
14. See, eg., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1971).
15. See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912); lB MOORE'S, supra
note 4, 1 0.412[1], at 1801.
judgment as determinative of an issue in the second action." 16 The pri-
mary rationale for this result is that a person should not be able to win
without taking the risk of losing:
Going back to the idea that the outsiders can participate in a victory
without bearing the burdens of defeat, I shall simply point out its
total inconsistency with the long-settled rule that resjudicata always
cuts both ways. A person is either all in or all out. As with William
James' cocktail, he must take the bitter with the sweet-or else not
drink any of it.17
The appeal of this rationale has not been universal. The first ma-
jor assault on the mutuality rule was made in Bernhard v. Bank of
America.18 A nonparty, closely related to the original defendant, was
permitted to use collateral estoppel defensively against the prior plain-
tiff. The California Supreme Court reasoned that a prior plaintiff
should not be permitted to switch adversaries for the sole purpose of
relitigating issues. ' 9 During the next thirty years, the assault on mutu-
ality continued, marked by the United States Supreme Court decision
in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Founda-
tion,20 in which the Court allowed defensive use of collateral estoppel
in a patent case,21 urging that "uncriticial acceptance of the principle of
mutuality of estoppel ...is today out of place."' 22 The Court ques-
tioned "whether it is any longer tenable to afford a litigant more than
one full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution of the same is-
sue. "23 The protection afforded the estopped party by limiting estoppel
rights to identical parties was replaced by the safeguard of requiring
that the estopped party have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
16. Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality, and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
1457, 1459 (1968).
17. Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 280 (1950) (footnote omitted).
18. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). Even before Bernhard, an exception to mutu-
ality was recognized where derivative liability existed between the prior party and the per-
son seeking to assert the estoppel. See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. I11,
127-28 (1912). Because these individuals were virtually in privity with one another, res judi-
cata principles could apply. See generally Development in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARV.
L. REV. 818, 840-50 (1952).
19. 19 Cal. 2d at 813-14, 122 P.2d at 895-96.
20. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
21. Prior to Blonder-Tongue patent litigation had been considered an area in which
mutuality was particularly appropriate. Due to the complex and ambiguous issues involved
in patent cases, courts had allowed relitigation of claims to prevent an unsound judgment
from controlling all later suits. In a sense, the courts had thought the need to prevent exten-
sion of uncertain judgments outweighed the need for judicial economy. See, e.g., Triplett v.
Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936); Nickerson v. Kutschera, 419 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1969). Seegener-
ally Callen & Kadue, To Bury Mutualiy, Not To Praise It." An Analysis of Collateral Estoppel
After Parklane Hosiery Co. P. Shore, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 700, 737-56 (1980).
22. 402 U.S. at 350.
23. Id. at 328.
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Following Blonder-Tongue, however, courts remained reluctant to
abandon mutuality in cases involving offensive, rather than defensive,
use of collateral estoppel. Three major concerns developed: the poten-
tial for reliance on inconsistent judgments, 25 the danger that the party
against whom collateral estoppel is asserted might not have had suffi-
cient incentive to litigate fully the original suit,26 and the incentive for
potential plaintiffs to "wait-and-see" the outcome of the first suit when
they should have joined that original suit.27
In Zdanok v. Glidden Co.,28 the court noted that the distinction
between offensive and defensive use of collateral estoppel had arisen
from Professor Currie's multiple claimant anomaly.29 Currie hypothe-
sized a situation involving a train crash in which twenty-five separate
actions involving the same issue of liability were decided for the de-
fendant and a twenty-sixth for the plaintiff. If subsequent plaintiffs
were allowed to assert collateral estoppel offensively, they might rely
on the one anomalous judgment.30 Courts following the rationale in
Zdanok, which approved offensive use, granted pleas of collateral es-
toppel only if there had been no previous inconsistent judgment on
identical issues.3'
24. Id. at 329. See also Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950): "iT]he achievement of substantial justice rather than symmetry
is the measure of the fairness of the rules of resjudicata."
25. See notes 28-31 & accompanying text infra.
26. See notes 32-36 & accompanying text infra.
27. See notes 37-41 & accompanying text infra.
28. 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964). In Zdanok, one of the first
cases to permit offensive use of collateral estoppel, five employees secured a judgment
against their employer based on violation of a collective bargaining agreement. Subsequent
to the employees' victory, 160 other employees sought to benefit from the prior judgment.
Despite the employer's contention that he had new evidence to offer on the issue of the
violation, the Second Circuit concluded that "where litigants have once battled for the
court's decision, they should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted, to
battle for it again." 327 F.2d at 953.
29. Id. at 955. That anomaly is discussed in Currie, Mutuality ofEstoppel" Limits of the
Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 304 (1957). Currie's fear of the multiple claimant
problem became less acute in Currie, Ci Procedure.- The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L.
REV. 25 (1965).
30. Currie, Mutuality of Estoppel- Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv.
281, 304 (1957).
31. Since the case relied upon for the estoppel in Zdanok was the first judgment con-
cerning the collective bargaining agreement, there had been no previous inconsistent judg-
ments. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
The court also indicated in dicta that offensive use might not have been proper had the first
case "turned on personal sympathy or any other consideration relating specifically to [the
plaintiffs in the first suit]." 327 F.2d at 956. See also note 59 & accompanying text infra.
Although later courts were wary of inconsistent judgments, they began to question the ab-
stract importance of the offensive-defensive distinction. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labora-
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The second concern over offensive use of collateral estoppel has
been the potential unfairness of adversely binding a party who did not
have incentive to litigate the original action vigorously. Berner v. Brit-
ish Commonwealth Pacfioc Airlines, Ltd.,32 for example, followed an ac-
tion in which one plaintiff recovered $35,000 from an airline company
for injuries resulting from an airplane crash. 33 Subsequently, in Ber-
ner, several other passengers sought $7 million in damages from the
company and attempted to invoke collateral estoppel on the issue of the
airline's negligence.34 The Second Circuit denied the plea, limiting of-
fensive use of collateral estoppel to situations in which the party against
whom the plea is asserted can foresee the subsequent litigation and
thus has an incentive to litigate the first action vigorously. 35 This limi-
tation places a heavy evidentiary burden upon the party asserting col-
lateral estoppel to demonstrate the existence of that incentive. 36
tories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Vanguard Recording Soc'y,
Inc. v. Fantasy Records, 24 Cal. App. 3d 410, 100 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1972). Even the Zdanok
court noted that the distinction between offensive and defensive use is "simply a rule of
thumb." 327 F.2d at 956. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1975).
32. 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966).
33. 346 F.2d at 539 (citing Halmos v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., No.
34123 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 1959)).
34. 346 F.2d at 538-39.
35. "The [defendant's] failure to appeal [the first judgment for $35,000] for correction
of whatever errors may have been made seems altogether reasonable and would very proba-
bly have not been the case if [the company] knew then that that judgment would govern the
Kapell action in which far more-$7,003,000-was sought in damages." Id. at 540-41. See
also Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944);
Annot., 152 A.L.R. 1187 (1944). The same considerations of foreseeability form part of the
basis of the res judicata rule against splitting a cause of action, although the major rationale
for the res judicata rule is to promote resolution of all disputes between two adversaries in
one suit. Cf. Rush v. City of Maple Heights, 167 Ohio St. 221, 147 N.E.2d 599, cert. denied,
358 U.S. 814 (1958) (plaintiffs victory in $100 property damage action denied res judicata
effect in later $12,000 personal injury action arising out of same accident; in fact, resjudicata
invoked against plaintiff in second action).
36. In Berner, the mere possibility of subsequent litigation proved to be insufficient to
show that the airline company had incentive to litigate vigorously the original action. Al-
though the company did not know that the Kapell action would be "governed" by the previ-
ous judgment, it did know that Kapell was planning on pursuing litigation. Kapell had filed
an earlier suit, which was dismissed on stipulation. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac.
Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 539 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966). In United
States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash., D. Nev. 1962), afl'd sub nom.
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951
(1964), decided just prior to Berner, this evidentiary burden was met. Twenty-four suits had
been consolidated in California on behalf of passengers involved in an airplane crash.
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 286 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S.
951 (1964). Seven suits subsequently were filed by Nevada residents in a Nevada district
court. The Nevada district court permitted the seven passengers to invoke collateral estop-
pel offensively on the basis of the California judgment against the airline company. The
[Vol. 31
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The final concern is that the availability of offensive use of collat-
eral estoppel might prompt individuals who could have joined the orig-
inal action to "wait-and-see" the outcome of the original action.37
Although both offensive and defensive use of collateral estoppel con-
serve courts' and litigants' time by preventing relitigation of issues, the
two uses affect joinder in different ways. When a party makes defen-
sive use of collateral estoppel, the estopped party usually is seeking to
relitigate against a different defendant. 38 Thus, defensive use encour-
ages joinder of all possible defendants in the first action.39
In contrast, the availability of offensive use may not encourage
joinder. Persons who could have been plaintiffs in an initial action
might stand on the sidelines, knowing that they may assert a favorable
judgment without risking the binding effect of an unfavorable out-
come.40 This pattern of behavior frustrates the very purpose of judicial
economy underlying collateral estoppel. Moreover, widespread offen-
sive use could subject the party estopped to multiple and often vexa-
tious liabilities. Thus, to the extent that offensive assertion of collateral
estoppel discourages joinder of parties and claims, mutuality promotes
the policies of economy and finality.41
These three problems peculiar to offensive use generated much
confusion in the federal courts. The Supreme Court presented the
first systematic analysis of these concerns in Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore,42 a case in which the court granted a plea for offensive assertion
of collateral estoppel. In Parklane, a proxy statement for a proposed
merger spawned a stockholder's derivative suit against Parklane filed
by Leo Shore in a New York district court.43 Before the derivative suit
came to trial, the SEC brought an action against Parklane based on the
court found that the issue of liability had been fully litigated in the California suit, 216 F.
Supp. at 726, and that the airline company had admitted that it could offer no new evidence
on the issue of its liability. Id. at 728.
37. See Note, The Impacts /Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by
a Nonparty, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1010 (1967).
38. Collateral estoppel sometimes may be used defensively by plaintiffs against prior
defendants. A plaintiff may employ collateral estoppel defensively to preclude the defend-
ant from asserting a claim for affirmative relief, the precluded issue may be based on either
an affirmative defense or a counterclaim by the defendant in the first action.
39. Collateral estoppel was used defensively in the Bernhard case. See notes 18-19 &
accompanying text supra.
40. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-31 (1979).
41. In recognition of this benefit of mutuality, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 88(3) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975) suggests that offensive use be denied to nonparties
where joinder would be discouraged.
42. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
43. See Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1977), affd, 439 U.S.
322 (1979).
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same proxy statement.44 The SEC suit for injunctive relief, proceeding
without a jury, resulted in a judgment in favor of the SEC that estab-
lished Parklane's proxy statement as materially false and misleading.45
Following the SEC judgment, Shore moved in the derivative suit
for summary judgment against Parklane, based upon the issues liti-
gated in the SEC suit.46 The New York district court denied Shore's
plea for offensive use of collateral estoppel on the ground that to allow
it would deprive Parklane of its right to a jury trial on the proxy state-
ment issue.47 The Second Circuit reversed, ruling that "once those is-
sues have been fully and fairly adjudicated in a prior proceeding,
nothing remains for trial, either with or without a jury. '" 4 8
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's decision,49 an-
nouncing a four-part test for determining when offensive use of collat-
eral estoppel is appropriate in the federal courts. The test specifically
addresses the three major concerns with offensive use of collateral es-
toppel by attempting to limit any potential unfairness to defendants.
The first inquiry is whether the "plaintiff could easily have joined the
earlier action."50 The second is whether the defendant could have fore-
seen a later use of offensive collateral estoppel and therefore had
"every incentive to litigate [the original action] fully and vigorously."51
The third inquiry, referring to the multiple claimant problem,52 is
whether "the judgment relied upon as a basis for the estoppel is itself
inconsistent with one or more previous judgments in favor of the de-
fendant."53 Finally, the Court directed federal judges to consider
whether "the second action affords the defendant procedural opportu-
nities unavailable in the first action that could readily cause a different
44. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), a 'd, 558 F.2d
1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
45. Id.
46. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d at 818.
47. Id., reviewed in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
48. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 819 (2d Cir. 1977). Due to a conflict
between the Second Circuit's decision and the Fifth Circuit's decision in Rachal v. Hill, 435
F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The propriety of offensive use
of collateral estoppel per se apparently was not at issue. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 435
U.S. 1006 (1978).
49. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
50. Id. at 331. This factor recognizes that the availability of offensive use may subvert
judicial economy by persons entertaining a wait-and-see attitude. See notes 37-41 & accom-
panying text supra.
51. 439 U.S. at 332. This factor remedies the Berner situation, in which the party
against whom collateral estoppel is asserted does not foresee potential liabilities. See Berner
v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 983 (1966). See notes 32-36 & accompanying text supra.
52. See notes 28-31 & accompanying text supra.
53. 439 U.S. at 330. This inquiry assures that an anomalous judgment will not be as-
serted in subsequent suits.
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result."54
The Court believed that the facts of Parkane did not show any of
these signs of unfairness to Parklane and therefore warranted offensive
use of collateral estoppel. Shore could not have joined the earlier SEC
suit without both the SEC's consent and the court's approval.5 5 The
filing of Shore's derivative suit prior to the start of the SEC action and
the foreseeability of later private actions56 provided Parklane the incen-
tive to defend the original action vigorously. There had not been any
previous judgment which could expose Parklane to inconsistent liabili-
ties.57 Finally, the court believed that Parklane could enjoy no new
procedural advantages in the later suit that might affect the outcome.58
Only in a footnote did the Court consider the right to a jury trial, deem-
ing it "basically neutral." 59
Some ramifications of the case are certain. For the first time, the
conduct of the party asserting collateral estoppel is an explicit concern;
prior cases relied largely on the fairness to the party being estopped.60
In addition, by inquiring into whether the plaintiff "could easily have
joined,"6 1 the Court sought to promote judicial economy by discourag-
ing a wait-and-see attitude among potential plaintiffs.62 Finally, there
54. Id. at 331. The Court, in discussing procedural opportunities, did not cite any ear-
lier cases which dealt with this concern about offensive use of collateral estoppel; it referred
only to a series of examples provided in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 88(2) (rent. Draft No. 2, 1975). 439 U.S. at 331 n.15. It is ironic that one of the examples
of a procedural advantage provided in § 88(2), Comment d, is the very right to jury trial that
the Parklane Court denied the defendant.
The Court also indicated that "other reasons" might exist that make offensive use of
collateral estoppel improper. -1d. The Court gave no examples of such "other reasons."
55. 439 U.S. at 332. Shore probably would have sought to intervene permissively, for
which the court's approval is necessary. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b). In addition, pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 78u(g) (1976), private parties must secure the approval of the SEC to join a suit the
SEC is prosecuting. See also SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 475 F.2d 1236, 1240 (2d
Cir. 1972).
56. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. at 332.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 332 n.19. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Rehnquist did not criticize the formu-
lation of the majority's four-step test for offensive use of collateral estoppel. Id. at 337.
Instead, he questioned the majority's application of the test. The deprivation of a jury trial,
he stressed, is not "neutral" but may afford one a distinct procedural advantage that may
well affect the outcome of the later suit. Id. at 353-54. Because Justice Rehnquist consid-
ered a jury trial a procedural advantage in the later suit, he criticized the majority's decision
as generally "unfair" to the party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted. Id. at
351.
60. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402
U.S. 313 (1971).
61. 439 U.S. at 331.
62. See id. at 329-30. See also notes 37-41 & accompanying text supra. By recognizing
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is no longer any doubt that collateral estoppel may abrogate a litigant's
right to a jury trial.
Other issues remain unresolved. First, there is some question
about whether the case applies to diversity cases as well as to federal
question cases.63 Second, the extent to which state courts will adopt the
that standing on the sidelines is a characteristic of offensive, but not defensive, use, the
Court, in a sense, revived the offensive-defensive distinction. But see Statman, The Defensive
Use of Collateral Estoppel after Parklane, 83 DICK. L. REV. 469 (1979), in which the author
asserts that the Parklane test applies to both offensive and defensive use. Id. at 474-75. The
Parklane Court, however, prefaced its test with the following wording: "[Tihe preferable
approach . . . is not to preclude the use of offensive collateral estoppel .... " 439 U.S. at
331. Even though the Court discounted the offensive-defensive distinction in a footnote, id.
at 331 n. 16, the Court's special recognition of whether the plaintiff could easily have joined,
id. at 33 1, is one basis of the offensive-defensive distinction.
63. Because Parklane is a federal question case, a narrow reading of the decision would
limit its scope solely to cases of federal question subject matter jurisdiction. Although there
is no explicit or implicit consideration of the jurisdictional variable in the opinion, in a
diversity case a district court, enamored of the mutuality doctrine, might give the case such a
narrow stare decisis effect.
A diversity court then would be compelled to decide whether collateral estoppel is prop-
erly a matter of federal or state law. Two general approaches are available for determining
whether federal or state collateral estoppel law should apply in diversity suits. One view
involves application of the Erie doctrine. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S.
525 (1958); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Res judicata and collateral estoppel
generally are viewed as "substantive" and "outcome-determinative" for Erie analysis pur-
poses. Thus, under Erie, the law of the state in which the later court is sitting controls. See,
e.g., Lynne Carol Fashions, Inc. v. Cranston Print Works Co., 453 F.2d 1177, 1181-82 (3d
Cir. 1972) (although state law was not applied for other reasons); Annot., 19 A.L.R. Fed. 709
(1974). In those states which have both abandoned mutuality and permitted offensive use of
collateral estoppel, the diversity court probably would reach the same result as in Parklane.
In those states which have either retained mutuality or refused to permit offensive assertion
of collateral estoppel, Parklane would not apply. Even in these latter jurisdictions, the
courts, influenced by conflicts of law principles, may find that "Rule 23 on class actions
clearly contemplates a uniform federal rule on whom [sic] is bound by such a suit." Degnan,
Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 763 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Degnan].
The second view is that the res judicata and collateral estoppel effects of a judgment are
dictated by full faith and credit and thus should be based on the law of the court rendering
the original judgment. See Kern v. Hettinger, 303 F.2d 333, 340 (2d Cir. 1962); Degnan,
supra, at 773; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976). The subsidiary premise of this view is that collateral
estoppel is within the ambit of res judicata. See Degnan, supra, at 764-67. Contra, Hart v.
American Airlines, 61 Misc. 2d 41, 304 N.Y.S.2d 810 (1969). Under this approach, a later
diversity court would use the federal law of the original federal class action court. Thus,
Parklane would control. Even if the earlier federal court were exercising diversity jurisdic-
tion, the federal law of that earlier court should apply. See Comment, Res Judicata in the
Federal Courts." Application of Federal or State Law: Possible Di/ferences Between the Two.
51 CORNELL L.Q. 96, 107 (1965). Contra, Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 978 (1959).
In sum, the sole situation in which a later federal court would not apply Parklane
would involve a later diversity court, employing the Erie approach, sitting in a jurisdiction
which either has retained mutuality or has not permitted offensive use of collateral estoppel.
Finally, Parklane is bound to have strong impact on the law of collateral estoppel in those
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policies announced in the opinion is unknown.64 Third, although the
Parklane test is defined carefully, it is not defined rigidly. Trial courts
are given "broad discretion 65 when considering the four factors. The
Supreme Court did not place any particular weight on each of the fac-
tors, nor did it indicate that the satisfaction of each and every step is
necessary. A balancing approach was not expressly adopted either.
Thus, the extent of Parklane's effect upon offensive assertion of collat-
eral estoppel, in large part, will be a matter of future judicial construc-
tion of the test.
Parklane. and the Class Action
In an individual suit following a class action, the case against al-
lowing assertion of collateral estoppel by persons who have opted out
can be particularly strong. In terms of the Parklane criteria, two gener-
alizations emerge: first, the three requirements concerning fairness to
the estopped party usually will be satisfied; and second, the require-
ment that the party asserting the estoppel could not have joined easily
rarely will be satisfied. This Note contends, however, that there is one
instance in which the opting-out party can present a strong argument
that he or she could not easily have joined the first action. That situa-
tion arises where a strong individual interest in the litigation by the
opting-out party ensures that he or she would opt out irrespective of
possible collateral estoppel rights.
Following a class suit, the satisfaction of the first Parklane fairness
criterion-sufficient incentive to litigate the first action fully-can be
shown by analogy to mass accident cases.66 This analogy, based on the
states which have not yet permitted offensive assertion of collateral estoppel. The instances
in which a federal court might decline to follow Parklane thus appear quite few.
64. See Callen & Kadue, To Bury Mutuality, Not to Praise It: An Analysis of Collateral
Estofppel After Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 755, 758-59 (1980).
65. 439 U.S. at 331. Courts also may consider "other reasons" in making their deci-
sion. Id.
66. The similarities have led some commentators to advocate the use of class actions
for mass disasters. 3B MOORE'S, supra note 4, 23.45[3], at 23-353 to -354 n.40; 7A WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 2, § 1783, at 117; Note, Mass Accident Class Actions, 60 CALIF. L.
REv. 1615, 1635 (1972). Contra, Weinstein, Revision of Procedure.- Some Problems in Class
Actions, 9 BUFFALO L. REV. 433, 469 (1960). The expense and the complexity of litigating
the central issue of tort liability in these cases suggest class treatment. Particularly in air-
plane crashes, the defendant would not be likely to raise individual defenses. 7A WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 2, § 1783, at 117; see also Comment, The Use of Class Actions for Mass
Accident Litigation, 23 Loy. L. REv. 383, 384-87 (1977). Finally, the class action could
prevent any possibility of a multiple claimant anomaly arising out of scattered individual
suits. See Brousseau, A Reader'r Guide to the Proposed Changes in the Preclusion Provisions
of the Restatement of Judgments, I1 TULSA L.J. 305, 329 (1976).
The view favoring class action treatment of mass disasters is contrary to the contention
of the federal rules Advisory Committee that a "'mass accident' resulting in injuries to nu-
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large number of claimants and the large amounts at stake, is significant
in that even the defenders of mutuality have abandoned the doctrine in
mass disaster litigation:67
The amounts involved in such mass-disaster cases are such that the
defendant will obviously devote all available resources to the de-
fense. The defendant in such cases knows that there are many proba-
ble plaintiffs, who, if not already joined, will be waiting in the
wings. . . . Moreover, as a practical matter, defendants in such cir-
cumstances do not have a realistic expectation of winning later suits
because of the high emotional appeal to the jury of mass-disaster
claims. . . . Thus, catastrophic events provide the most convincing
cases supporting the use of the prior actions to bind the losing de-fendant.68
Similarly, the class opponent certainly has incentive in the prior suit to
litigate vigorously issues against a class "so numerous that joinder of all
merous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that
significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liability, would be
present, affecting the individuals in different ways .... [A] class action would degenerate
in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried." Advisory Committee Note, 39 F.R.D.
69, 103 (1966).
The trend in the courts is to disfavor class treatment for mass disasters. Apart from the
Advisory Committee's warning that individual issues of fact and law make the class device
unwieldy, the major justification for denying class action treatment of mass disasters is that
individual interests are too strong to warrant class treatment, particularly where the various
plaintiffs reside outside the personal jurisdiction of the court. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911
(1975); Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392, 398-99 (E.D. Va. 1975)
(rejecting analysis of In re Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624 (C.D. Cal. 1972), which permitted class
certification in a mass accident suit for declaratory relief). See also Note, Air Crash Disas-
ters, 42 J. AIR L. & COM. 255, 262-66 (1976); Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive
Assertion of CollateralEstoppelbyaNonparty, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1010, 1043 (1967). A
related fear of according class treatment to mass disasters is that too many persons would
opt out and later assert collateral estoppel offensively. See Comment, The Use of Class
Actionsfor Mass Accident Litigation, 23 Loy. L. REv. 383, 393-94 (1977). The courts appear
to prefer handling mass disaster litigation under the Multidistrict Litigation Statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1407 (1976), or by consolidation pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a).
See Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392, 399 (E.D. Va. 1975).
The very situation in which class treatment of mass disasters is most disfavored-where
plaintiffs have strong individual interests in controlling their own litigation, Causey v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392, 399 (E.D. Va. 1975)-is the situation in
which this Note advocates offensive use of collateral estoppel by opting-out parties. If in-
deed a large number of class members have strong individual interests, the class probably
was not properly certified. See text accompanying notes 106-09 infra. At the other extreme,
if only a few opting-out parties have strong individual interests, those parties have valid
concerns and thus should not be punished for opting out. The punishment, of course, would
be the denial to them of collateral estoppel rights which they might have enjoyed if the
original suit were not a class action.
67. See Overton, The Restatement of Judgments, Collateral Estoppel, and Conflict of
Laws, 44 TENN. L. REV. 927, 943-44 (1977).
68. 1d. at 943.
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members is impracticable. ' 69 The danger of a small class judgment
supporting a later, larger individual judgment is negligible, since the
amount involved in the class judgment is likely to exceed greatly all
later individual claims.72 The class opponent thus feels pressures to de-
fend comparable to those felt by the defendant in the mass disaster
case.7'
Most class actions are likely to satisfy the second Parklane fairness
criterion as well; because a class suit by definition is a consolidation of
many claims, 72 it is highly unlikely that the class judgment would rep-
resent an anomalous judgment inconsistent with any previous ones. In-
stead, class suits promote uniform decisions. 73 Finally, no apparent
procedural opportunities exist in individual suits that do not exist in
class suits. Not only do class suits follow the same general procedures
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
70. In such situations "the courts may be trusted to apply properly the adequate oppor-
tunity to litigate rule to reach an equitable result. Even assuming that were not so, however,
this consideration is irrelevant in the case of class action, since the parties should be aware of
the broad binding effect of the judgment and can be expected to defend to the utmost against
an unfavorable finding of liability." Note, Class Action Judgments and Mutuality of Estop-
pel, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 814, 824 (1975) (footnote omitted). But see Greenebaum, In
Defense of the Doctrine of Mutuality of Estoppel, 45 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1969).
71. Two early cases permitting offensive use of collateral estoppel resembled both mass
disaster and class action suits. In United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709
(E.D. Wash., D. Nev. 1962), arffidsub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379
(9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964), the 7 Nevada residents who sought to assert
collateral estoppel were in many respects absent class members in relation to the 24 original
passengers who brought suit in California. Similarly, in Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d
944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964), judicial construction of the disputed collec-
tive bargaining agreement was bound to affect all 165 employees, not just the 5 who brought
the original action. Noting that the law of the case from the first suit would have strong
impact on the outcome of the second suit, the court remarked: "While the Alexander plain-
tiffs were not parties to the Zdanok action, it is clear that everyone expected their rights to be
governed by the court's interpretation of the contract in that test case." Id. at 953 (footnote
omitted).
The Parklane situation also bears similarities to the class suit. The SEC functions as a
monolithic representative of investors; the securities holders usually are the primary benefi-
caries of a judgment favorable to the SEC. See, e.g., Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 342
F.2d 596, 602 (7th Cir. 1965); Palmer v. Thomson & McKinnon Auchincloss, Inc., 427 F.
Supp. 915, 921 (D. Conn. 1977). The investors represented by the SEC resemble absent class
members, particularly following Parklane. Defendants in an SEC suit will be extremely
aware of private investors waiting in the wings: "The Parklane decision has special signifi-
cance in governmental actions and greatly enhances the enforcement capabilities of the
SEC. The courts will experience an increase in the number of private actions since major
issues will be litigated for plaintiffs at the SEC's expense." 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 611, 620
(1979).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
73. "[Tlhe very purpose underlying class actions is to ensure uniform treatment of the
class members, and, even though the judgment may not represent 'ultimate truth,' it is im-
portant that it be given effect." Note, Class Action Judgments and Mutuality of Estoppel, 43
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 814, 823 (1975).
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as individual suits74 but also the court's role in managing the class
suit75 should protect, rather than harm, the class opponent. In sum, the
class suit represents perhaps the ideal situation for offensive assertion
of collateral estoppel, in terms of fairness to the class opponent.
Because class actions generally will meet the fairness criteria of
Parklane, the crucial issue is whether the person who opts out of a class
could not have easily joined76 the original action. In applying this fac-
tor of Parklane, a court must look beyond the simple inquiry of
whether a person could have become a party without undue difficulty.
The rationale for the requirement is to discourage persons from adopt-
ing a wait-and-see attitude, not necessarily to compel joinder in all
cases.77 Viewed in this light, the requirement raises the question of
whether the party asserting collateral estoppel could have joined easily
but has not done so because he or she has adopted a wait-and-see atti-
tude. Thus, the wait-and-see rationale imposes a more circumscribed
inquiry than the broad possibility of joinder.
An individual who opts out of a class action following receipt of
the best practicable notice78 has decided affirmatively not to intervene
in the suit. But this conscious exclusion from the class does not neces-
sarily mean that the individual has adopted a wait-and-see attitude.
Other reasons for the decision to opt out might exist. 79
An Illinois district court recognized a justifiable motive for al-
lowing a person who has opted out to assert collateral estoppel offen-
sively in In re TransOcean Tender Offer Securities Litigation.80 Vickers,
the majority stockholder of TransOcean Oil, made a tender offer for
74. One might argue that the pressure to settle a class suit represents a procedural dis-
advantage for the class opponent in the earlier action. Yet the courts are unlikely to accept
this reasoning. The pressures normally considered procedural advantages and disadvan-
tages include "discovery devices, plenary as distinct from summary hearing, and the right of
jury trial." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88, Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1975). For a discussion of whether a jury trial is a procedural advantage, see note 54 &
accompanying text supra. Economic pressures simply do not fall into this procedural termi-
nology. Moreover, if the original class suit is in fact settled, the class opponent will not
suffer in the later suit, because settlements generate no collateral estoppel effect.
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d). See also Note, Substantive Policies and Procedural Decisions-
An Approach to Certifying Rule 23(b)(3) Antitrust Class Actions, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 491, 530-
32 (1979).
76. 439 U.S. at 331.
77. Id. at 331-33.
78. "In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to
the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances .. " FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(c)(2). See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173-77 (1974).
79. "[T]here are many possible reasons-apart from 'waiting on the sidelines' to see
what happens in a class action-why class members might elect to exclude themselves." In
re TransOcean Tender Offer Sec. Litigation, 455 F. Supp. 999, 1008 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
80. 455 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
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the minority shares of the corporation.81 Minority stockholders filed
federal court actions against Vickers and other officials of TransOcean
in New York, Illinois, and Louisiana.82 Former minority shareholders
then brought a class action against Vickers in a Delaware state court.
83
The stockholders who brought the New York federal action, as well as
several Illinois and Louisiana plaintiffs, opted out of the Delaware
class.84 On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court entered judgment in
plaintiffs' favor s5 Subsequently, the federal actions were consolidated
in the Northern District of Illinois, where those plaintiffs who had
opted out of the Delaware action asked for summary judgment on the
basis of the Delaware judgment.86
Citing the Second Circuit's opinion in Parklane87 with approval,88
the Illinois district court granted the plaintiffs' motion. The court fo-
cused on the impact of collateral estoppel on the party estopped, not on
"whether or not a particular litigant is rewarded. . . . The rationale
for the rule is to expedite judicial resources where the party seeking to
retry issues has already had his day in court. . . . [T]he policy of end-
ing litigation is essential." 89
Although the court felt that the opting out party did not adopt a
wait-and-see attitude,90 it did not develop any explicit test for evaluat-
ing the conduct of the party asserting collateral estoppel. 9 ' Without the
benefit of the Supreme Court's opinion in Parklane, the Illinois district
court paid scant attention to the possibility that offensive use of collat-
eral estoppel might encourage an increase in the total amount of litiga-
tion brought by opting-out parties:
To not apply collateral estoppel because the opt out plaintiffs might
be "waiting on the sidelines" would undermine the important policy
reasons for applying collateral estoppel. Courts which have enforced
81. Id. at 1001.
82. Id.
83. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 351 A.2d 570 (Del. Ch. 1976).
84. See 455 F. Supp. at 1002.
85. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977).
86. 455 F. Supp. at 1003.
87. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977),propriety of offensive use
of collateral estoppel affirmed, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
88. 455 F. Supp. at 1006 n.6.
89. Id. at 1007 (citing In re TransOcean Tender Offer Sec. Litigation, 427 F. Supp.
1211, 1219 (N.D. Ill. 1977)). In TransOcean, the federal court permitted collateral estoppel
on the basis of a state court judgment. Although this Note explores only the use of collateral
estoppel within the same federal system, the TransOcean court was willing to go even fur-
ther.
90. 455 F. Supp. at 1007.
91. ld. at 1008. In a non-sequitur, the court remarked in conclusory terms: "Nor have
they sat by idly on the sidelines while the class and defendants did battle. Rather, the opt
out plaintiffs, in these proceedings, are attempting to prevent the defendants from litigating
matters . I..." Id  at 1007.
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the offensive use of collateral estoppel have not considered the mo-
tives of those plaintiffs who, though not joining in the first lawsuit,
seek the benefit of the judgment in a subsequent lawsuit. This court
will likewise not indulge in exploring the motives of the opt out
plaintiffs who seek to assert collateral estoppel based on the Dela-
ware Supreme Court's decision .... 92
The major policy justifications cited by the court for permitting offen-
sive use were that "an extremely small percentage of persons seek ex-
clusion" and that "few people can afford" filing a separate lawsuit.
93
Although the Parklane Court did not adopt such a cavalier atti-
tude toward sitting on the sidelines, it probably would have concurred
with the TransOcean result. The New York plaintiffs' filing of their
own action before judgment in the original suit is evidence that they
did not adopt a wait-and-see attitude. There is no evidence to the con-
trary. Thus, the New York plaintiffs probably could satisfy this step of
the Parklane test.94 The motives of the New York plaintiffs presuma-
bly arose out of a sizeable interest in controlling their own litigation.
Because the separate suit was filed before judgment in the original
suit,9 5 the defendants certainly could have foreseen separate actions
and thus had every incentive to litigate the issue of liability fully the
first time. Since the only suit which had come to judgment was the one
sought to be extended, no inconsistent judgments could have vexed the
defendant. Finally, the possibility of procedural advantage96 in the
later suit was nowhere apparent. Thus, although the case was decided
without the guidance of the Supreme Court's opinion, all four Parklane
factors probably were satisfied in TransOcean. Alternatively, if Park-
lane is read to require a balancing of the four factors,97 the ample satis-
faction of the three fairness factors in the class context might
overshadow the fact that the opting-out members easily could have
joined the original action.
Allowing collateral estoppel in the TransOcean situation served
the purposes of collateral estoppel. Judicial economy was served by
relieving the district court and the litigants before that court from the
burden of relitigating the issue of Vickers' liability. There was no dan-
ger of a wait-and-see attitude, since the New York plaintiffs had filed
their action before they opted out of the Delaware suit.98 The estoppel
broadened the binding effect of the first suit, thus creating a uniform
line of decisions, a shared purpose of both collateral estoppel and the
92. Id. at 1008.
93. Id.
94. 439 U.S. at 330-31. See also notes 76-77 & accompanying text supra.
95. See 455 F. Supp. at 1002.
96. See note 54 & accompanying text supra.
97. See note 65 & accompanying text supra.
98. 455 F. Supp. at 1002.
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class action rule.99
The TransOcean situation involving strong individual interests is
the sole instance that warrants offensive use of collateral estoppel by a
person who opts out of a class action. To preserve the economies of the
class suit and to protect the class opponent from endless litigation, this
instance should be circumscribed quite narrowly. Although the strong
individual interest situation ought to be determined by narrow, objec-
tive criteria, any definition of this instance makes an inquiry into a
plaintiff's motives unavoidable. Despite the TransOcean court's re-
mark that it would "not indulge in exploring the motives of the opt out
plaintiffs," 100 step one of the Parklane test and its underlying rationale
require such an exploration. To determine whether a plaintiff has
adopted a wait-and-see attitude is, by definition, to ask why the plain-
tiff has opted out. Nonetheless, this subjective inquiry can focus on
several concrete considerations.
The first consideration, present in TransOcean, should be whether
the opting-out party has manifested a strong individual interest by
filing an individual suit in a timely fashion, preferably before trial of
the original class suit, but at a minimum before judgment in the class
suit. The time at which the party opts out also may be significant; the
earlier the decision is made, the less chance there is that the plaintiff is
basing the decision on the progress of the class suit. The second con-
sideration should be whether the plaintiff has taken a combination of
further steps to prosecute that individual suit vigorously. The plaintiff
would bear the evidentiary burden of proving these further subjective
steps. This burden is severe, since the opt-out plaintiff would have to
show that during the typically protracted course of the class suit, he or
she had taken a persistent and strong interest in pursuing separate liti-
gation. These further steps would involve pursuit of customary litiga-
tion practices, such as discovery, pretrial and settlement' 01 conferences,
and preliminary motions. Alternatively, the plaintiff could show that
failure to take these further steps was caused by a compelling reason
beyond the plaintiffs control. Such a reason might include the pen-
99. See generally LaMar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 55 F.R.D. 22, 24-25 (D. Or.
1972); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (), 81 HARV. L. Rav. 356 (1967).
100. 455 F. Supp. at 1008.
101. An opt-out plaintiff who truly seeks to settle a later suit, may present the ultimate
proof that his or her individual interest is so strong that he or she would opt out irrespective
of collateral estoppel rights. Because settlements have no collateral estoppel effect, the
plaintiff would be seeking to deny him- or herself collateral estoppel rights. In contrast,
however, the opt-out plaintiff may use the possible availability of collateral estoppel as a
bargaining chip at a settlement conference. This behavior could indicate precisely the oppo-
site of a strong individual interest. Thus, the courts must be careful in evaluating whether
pursuing settlement constitutes vigorous litigation.
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dency of an SEC action, as in Parklane, that would have substantial
impact on the opt-out plaintiffs case.
These considerations, indicia of a person's strong individual inter-
est, provide a clear refinement of the first Parklane factor which in-
quires whether the plaintiff could easily have joined. If the party who
opts out is named in the original class suit and has filed an individual
suit as well, the class opponent certainly can foresee future litigation
and thus has incentive to litigate fully the original action. In such an
instance, where little reason for denying collateral estoppel exists, one
author noted:
[W]ould it not also make a mockery of the law if. . . the court and
the litigants must endure a second complex litigation on the same
subject matter, merely to teach the opted-out member a lesson? And
if that second litigation ends in a judgment favorable to the opted-
out member, should the court have to suffer a third trial if another
member of the class who likewise opted-out relies on collateral estop-
pel by reason of the first or second judgment? 102
Two Criticisms: Increased Litigation and
One-Way Intervention
From the perspective of the policies underlying the class action
rule, allowing offensive use of collateral estoppel by those opting out
would frustrate two purposes of Rule 23: the class device might not
promote economical resolution of controversies, and a new form of
oneway intervention might emerge. Because collateral estoppel is a
discretionary doctrine, courts might be persuaded by these problems to
sacrifice the policies of collateral estoppel to the policies of the class
action rule. An analysis of these criticisms, however, shows that neither
has merit when the party opting out has a strong individual interest.
The existence of a large number of persons holding strong individ-
ual interests would both shrink the size of the original class and gener-
ate an increase in the number of subsequent suits filed. This result
would subvert the goals of economy embodied in both the class device
and collateral estoppel. Moreover, the class opponent would be sub-
jected to the undue hardship of defending a large number of individual
suits that the class action itself was supposed to consolidate. Several
safeguards, however, should prevent such a result. These protections
are rooted in the practical risks and expenses involved with opting out,
the class action certification mechanism, and the function of the later
court considering whether to permit collateral estoppel.
The initiative and expense involved in filing a separate suit and
102. Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 647
(1971). But see Note, A Probabilistic Analysis of the Doctrine ofMutualitfy of Collateral Estop-
pel, 76 MICH. L. REv. 612, 618 (1978).
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pursuing litigation provide a threshold limit on the number of persons
who might assert collateral estoppel offensively. 10 3 Furthermore, a
large-scale class suit, in which issues often are litigated extensively, is
likely to generate substantial stare decisis effect. 104 If a person opts out
of a class suit that is resolved adversely to him or her, that person is not
entirely free of harmful impact from the case. 05 Although collateral
103. "As a practical matter, an extremely small percentage of persons seek exclusion
from a class and to be represented by their own counsel. Moreover, few people can afford to
bear the cost and burden of opting out and filing their own lawsuits. This is especially so
where the individual claims are small." In re TransOcean Tender Offer Sec. Litigation, 455
F. Supp. 999, 1008 (N.D. Ill. 1978). See also In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 75
F.R.D. 727, 732 (N.D. Ill.), appeal dismissed, 567 F.2d 392 (1977).
104. "Where a question of law'is decisive in a case or where a mixed question of law and
fact has been and will be tried by a judge, the concept of stare decisis furnishes almost the
same advantages as a class action. It is an anomalous but accepted characteristic of our
system that a decision on the law effectively binds non-parties without upsetting our assur-
ance that due process has been done and without the court's feeling any need to assure
adequate representation of a legal point. . . . It is unlikely that the same or a lower court
will reach different results on the law in related cases." Weinstein, Revision of Procedure:
Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFFALO L. REV. 433, 446 (1960). Within the federal
system, stare decisis may have less of an impact where a higher court is considering the
original decision of a lower court. Id See also Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161,
168 (1939); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 755 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
885 (1974); Note, Notice and Due Process in Federal Class Actions: A Requiem for Revised
Rule 23, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 479, 509 (1975).
105. It is possible that in the future a class opponent might assert defensive collateral
estoppel against the opting-out person in a later action. Ordinarily, binding a nonparty
adversely constitutes a denial of the due process rights to notice and an opportunity to be
heard. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313,
329 (1971) (dictum). But class actions generally replace the right to be heard with adequate
representation by the member before the court. Representation creates a form of "privity"
among class members. Even though the opting-out party voluntarily divests the representa-
tive of his or her authority, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTs, § 86(1)(c), Comment
d, Illustration 6 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975), the opting-out party still may be adequately repre-
sented.
Two cases approving use of collateral estoppel against nonparties had characteristics of
a class action. In Cauefield v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 247 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. La. 1965), aft'd,
378 F.2d 876 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1009 (1967), 41 cemetary plot owners had
brought suit against a caretaker for desecration of property. After the owners lost, two other
plot owners, represented by the same attorney as those in the first suit, brought an action on
the same theory. The attorney conceded that no new evidence could be introduced; the two
plot owners themselves had testified at the original trial. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
lower court holding that the two plaintiffs were estopped from litigating their claim on the
basis of the earlier suit, to which they technically were not parties. Citing this case, one
author remarked that "it is clear that the rule [against binding nonparties] has never been as
absolute as it has frequently been regarded." Note, Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 87
HARV. L. REv. 1485, 1497 (1974).
In In re Air Crash Near Dayton, Ohio, 350 F. Supp. 757 (S.D. Ohio 1972), rev'd sub
nom. Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 956 (1974),
several passengers brought suits against the defendants. In consolidated pretrial proceed-
ings, an agreement was made that one case go to trial before the others. One plaintifi's
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estoppel works no harm upon that individual, stare decisis very often
does. Thus, the person who opts out as a practical matter does not
escape entirely free of risk.
The court hearing the class suit could prevent an unduly large
number of those who opt out from employing collateral estoppel by
decertifying the class. Two of the factors to be considered in certifica-
tion of a 23(b)(3) suit are "the interest of members of the class in indi-
vidually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions"' 0 6
and "the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class." 0 7 If individ-
ual interests are too strong, these requirements dictate that the suit
should not proceed as a class action.'08 Thus, the class certification
mechanism may provide the ultimate control to prevent too many indi-
viduals from opting out and later asserting collateral estoppel.10 9 Col-
lateral estoppel may well be the proper doctrine to accommodate the
competing concerns of the parties and the judiciary in those cases that
fall in that middle ground between actions in which the individual in-
terests are so strong that the class should not proceed, and those in
which they are so weak that the class suit should be the final, disposi-
tive action filed.
Finally, subsequent courts are granted "broad discretion" "0 to ap-
ply collateral estoppel. Just as the class action court cannot predeter-
mine the res judicata effect of a class judgment,"' that court cannot
lawyer had been invited but did not attend the meeting. The court held in favor of one of
the defendants. When the plaintiff, whose attorney had failed to attend the meeting, brought
an individual action against that defendant, the Ohio district court granted the defendant's
plea for defensive assertion of collateral estoppel. The court reasoned that estoppel of non-
parties "is especially applicable to protracted multiple litigation arising from common disas-
ters where the factual and legal issues concerning the liability of defendants are identical."
Id. at 765. The Sixth Circuit reversed, however, holding that due process still precludes
nonparties from being estopped. 487 F.2d at 671. Despite the major due process obstacle,
the courts have given some thought to estoppel of nonparties and may be willing to allow the
practice in the near future.
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A).
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(B).
108. See, e.g., Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392, 398-99 (E.D. Va.
1975), where the court held that individual interests were a sufficient reason not to certify the
class.
109. This procedural mechanism would not prevent all class actions from proceeding
when opting-out parties have individual interests. Some actions, on balance, would be certi-
fied. In those cases, however, the later court would possess the exclusive right to determine
whether collateral estoppel may be appropriate. That court need not conclude from the
earlier court's act of certification alone that no strong individual interest warranting preclu-
sive rights exists.
110. See note 65 & accompanying text supra.
11l. The class action rule "does not disturb the recognized principle that the court con-
ducting the action cannot predetermine the resjudicata effect of the judgment; this can be
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forecast the collateral estoppel rights of an opting-out party.112 Thus, if
the later court decides that judicial economy would not result, it could
deny the opting-out party estoppel rights, irrespective of the policy
mandates of Rule 23.
Conversely, the later court should allow collateral estoppel ifjudi-
cial economy would be promoted. Assuming that the opting-out per-
son would bring a later suit irrespective of collateral estoppel rights, a
successful plea of collateral estoppel would prevent wasteful relitiga-
tion of issues in the later suit without adversely affecting the joinder of
parties in the earlier suit. One of the major aims of amended Rule 23
also would be furthered, since offensive use of collateral estoppel would
maximize the binding effect of the earlier class judgment. Finally, in
such a situation the class opponent is not subject to any greater number
of subsequent liabilities than those the opponent would face had collat-
eral estoppel been denied. Thus, these safeguards assure that the avail-
ability of the offensive use of collateral estoppel will not burden
judicial economy. On the contrary, they encourage that economy.
The second concern from the standpoint of Rule 23 is that offen-
sive assertion of collateral estoppel would resurrect in another form
"the type of one-way intervention the amended rule was designed to
preclude."'1 3 Although the rulemakers were without authority to im-
tested only in a subsequent action." Advisory Committee Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 106 (1966).
The Rules Enabling Act provides that a federal rule "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). See also Taunton Gardens Co. v. Hills, 557
F.2d 877, 878 (1st Cir. 1977); Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 181 (1968).
112. By definition, collateral estoppel is a subset ofresjudicata. Collateral estoppel pre-
cludes specific issues while res judicata precludes all the issues in a particular claim. Thus,
collateral estoppel cannot be predetermined either. Nevertheless, the court, "in framing the
judgment in any suit brought as a class action, must decide what its extent or coverage shall
be, and if the matter is carefully considered, questions of resjidicata are less likely to be
raised at a later time and if raised will be more satisfactorily answered." Advisory Commit-
tee Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 106 (1966). Thus, a marginal distinction exists between defining
those included in the judgment and what those persons' res judicata and collateral estoppel
rights will be in later actions. If there is a conflict, however, a later court need not feel
compelled to follow the dictates of the earlier suit. Some later courts have not bound absent
class members when adequate representation and notice were lacking, even though the prior
suit had been duly certified, with consideration of representation and notice, as a class ac-
tion. See Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973). See generaly Note, Collateral
Attack on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87 HARV. L. REv. 589 (1974).
113. 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 1789, at 183. See also Cohn, The New
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1225 n.88 (1966); Note, Proposed Rule
23: ClassActions ReclassXed, 51 VA. L. REv. 629, 652-54 (1965). The Advisory Committee
Note itself declares: "Under proposed subdivision (c)(3), one-way intervention is excluded."
Advisory Committee Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105-06 (1966). The promulgators of original Rule
23 were not ready in 1938 to extend fully the binding effect of all class actions to absent class
members. Instead, they based the binding effect upon the common-law type of class certi-
fied by the court. "True" and "hybrid" suits bound all absent members. "Spurious" suits
bound only those before the court. See Advisory Committee Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105 (1966).
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print this policy upon the substantive law of collateral estoppel through
a federal rule, 1 4 their intent has influenced the reasoning of courts and
commentators.
The precise reasons for the drafters' policy against one-way inter-
vention are uncertain. One author noted that Justice Kaplan, then the
Reporter for the Advisory Committee, summarized his reasons for re-
jecting one-way intervention as including "that the procedure 'was dis-
tasteful' as 'lacking mutuality,' and 'a perverse anomaly' inasmuch as
'there could be a class action that did not run fully for or against the
class.' "'15
Perhaps one reason for this ambiguous reasoning has been the ex-
pansive use of the term "one-way intervention." The phrase is one of
many meanings. Originally, it referred to the practice employed by the
courts to allow absent members of the formerly "spurious" class suit to
intervene following a favorable judgment." 6 From this practice, many
generalized that any time a class member might benefit but not suffer
from a judgment, one-way intervention resulted." 7 One court an-
nounced that a major purpose of the amended class action rule is to
eliminate such one-way intervention." 8
A second form of one-way intervention occurs when parties opt
out and later attempt to share the damages awarded the class represen-
The courts wavered between considering the spurious suit as merely a procedural joinder
device or as a bona fide class action. This ambivalence stemmed from the notion that com-
mon questions of fact or law in a spurious suit did not create as tight a bond among class
members as did true and hybrid legal relations. It was presumed that spurious class mem-
bers might have a strong individual interest in bringing separate actions. As a result, the
courts initially did not bind absent members in a spurious suit. They gave spurious suits
greater class status, however, with the advent of one-way intervention, by which absent class
members could intervene following judgment to collect their award. See Kalven & Rosen-
field, The Contemporary Function ofthe Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684, 691-714 (1941);
Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee.- 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of
CivilProcedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 385-86 (1967). Few cases actually employed one-
way intervention. E.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 589 (10th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 801 (1963); York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 529
(2d Cir. 1944), rev'd, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (dictum); Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655,
668-69 (E.D. Mich. 1966). The amended Rule subsumed the spurious suit into the 23(b)(3)
category. "The central change for this formerly 'spurious' sort of action is that it is no longer
simply a form of 'permissive joinder' device. The amended Rule goes far in the direction of
making the result on the common questions binding for all members of the class." Frankel,
Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 43 (1967).
114. The judicial doctrine of collateral estoppel is regarded generally as a matter of sub-
stantive rights. See note 63 supra. The Federal Rules cannot impact upon any substantive
right. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
115. Developments, supra note 1, at 1395.
116. See note 113 supra.
117. See notes 119-25 & accompanying text infra.
118. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
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tative in the original suit. In Sarasota Oil Co. v. Greyhound Leasing &
Financial Corp.," 9 the owner of royalty interests in an oil well opted
out of a class suit brought by the operator of that well against a defend-
ant who had flooded the property. Once the operators secured a
favorable judgment, the royalty owner brought suit against that class
representative, seeking a portion of the proceeds, on the theory that a
"recovery by Greyhound is a substitute for produced oil and that Grey-
hound's contractual obligation to pay royalties therefrom is not affected
by their withdrawal from the class action."' 20 The Tenth Circuit disal-
lowed the claim, stating: "The right to intervene after judgment is pre-
cisely what the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to prevent
in (b)(3) class actions."' 121
A third situation labeled one-way intervention has arisen 22 when
courts have held mini-hearings on the merits of an action before send-
ing notice to absent class members. Absent class members may opt out
upon receiving notice of a discouraging finding in the hearing. If the
finding were favorable, all would remain in the suit. One court specifi-
cally criticized this type of hearing as a form of one-way interven-
tion. 23
Finally, when inadequately notified or inadequately represented
class members seek to benefit from a favorable class judgment,124 the
119. 483 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1973).
120. Id. at 451.
121. Id. at 452. In Sarasota, judgment for the original plaintiffs specifically excluded
damages for the opting-out individuals. Thus, any recovery by the individuals against the
successful class representative would have come directly out of that representative's pocket.
Id. at 451. See also Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop., 326 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Pa. 1971),
modded on other grounds, 463 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 913 (1973),
where the class representative attempted to collect damages for those members who had
opted out. The court disallowed plaintif's attempt because, among other reasons, the prac-
tice would restore a form of one-way intervention. 326 F. Supp. at 64.
122. In Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, 438 F.2d 825 (2d
Cir. 1970), the class opponent, worried about adverse publicity attendant to notice, urged a
preliminary hearing before notice was sent. 43 F.R.D. at 501-02. The district court held the
hearing. In effect, the class opponent consented, with the court's approval, to a form of one-
way intervention. Id Cf Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 885 (1974) (class opponent faced simliar publicity problems; class decertified but
allowed to proceed as a test case which would bind defendant adversely but would not bind
absent plaintiffs adversely).
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), however, the Supreme Court
chastised the preliminary hearing as being outside the authority of Rule 23. Id. at 178. See
generall, 3B MOORE'S, supra note 4, T 23.45[4.-4; Developments, supra note 1, at 1418-19,
1424-26.
123. Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349, 354 (7th Cir. 1975). See also American
Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 545-47 (1974); Developments, supra note 1, at
1419-20 n.159 & 1425-26.
124. Following a victory against the Selective Service System in Gregory v. Hershey, 311
F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Mich. 1969), several inadequately notified absent class members brought
May 1980] COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
label one-way intervention has been used. Since such absent class
members have been denied due process, an adverse judgment could not
bind them. Without this risk of losing, some courts have been hesitant
to permit these members to be bound favorably. 25
These four practices labeled one-way intervention share one com-
mon denominator-the proposition that an individual who cannot be
bound adversely should not be allowed to benefit from a favorable
judgment. This proposition is the precise definition of mutuality of es-
toppel; 126 to accept it is to advocate mutuality in the class context.
Thus, the criticism that offensive use of collateral estoppel resurrects
one-way intervention is ill founded. Disapproval of one-way interven-
tion for its lack of mutuality promotes a doctrine that has been aban-
doned by the federal courts 127 and is particularly inappropriate in the
class context. 128
In TransOcean, the class opponent contended that to allow the
opting-out plaintiffs offensive assertion of collateral estoppel would re-
instate a form of one-way intervention. 129 The district court recognized
individual suits to enforce the declaratory judgment. Because the absent class members
could not have been bound adversely on due process grounds, some courts declined to per-
mit these members to use the judgment favorably. Pasquier v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.
La. 1970), aft'dper curiam, 444 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1971); accord, McCarthy v. Director of
Selective Service System, 322 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D. Wis. 1970), afdper curiam, 460 F.2d
1089 (7th Cir. 1972). Cf Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452,
459 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (inadequately represented class members not permitted to employ
favorable judgment). Other courts allowed the inadequately notified class members in the
Gregory litigation to benefit from the favorable class judgment, reasoning that once a
favorable judgment is rendered, earlier violations of class members' due process rights
should not prevent their benefiting from the judgment via collateral estoppel. Schrader v.
Selective Service System, 329 F. Supp. 966, 967 (W.D. Wis. 1971), rev'd, 470 F.2d 73 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972). Accord, Whitmore v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1279 (D.
Neb. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971) (class members permitted to benefit from ear-
lier Gregory judgment, but not expressly based on collateral estoppel principles). Subse-
quent to these collateral suits, the Sixth Circuit reversed the original class judgment; the suits
that had upheld the original judgment collapsed. Gregory v. Tarr, 436 F.2d 513 (6th Cir.
1971). See generally Note, Class Action Judgments and Mutuality of Estoppel, 43 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 814 (1975).
125. See note 124 supra.
126. See notes 15-17 & accompanying text supra. One author wrote that the opt-out
provision itself "was conceived in order to provide full mutuality of estoppel to class mem-
bers who remained silent in response to notice .... " Kennedy, Federal Class Actions." A
Needfor Legislative Reform, 32 Sw. L.J. 1209, 1210 (1979).
127. See note 5 & accompanying text supra.
128. "Defense of the 1966 rule in terms of the principle of mutuality-that it is unfair to
bind one party to an adverse judgment if the other party would not also have been bound in
the event of defeat-would, of course, be anachronistic." Developments, supra note 1, at
1395. See note 15 & accompanying text supra.
129. In re TransOcean Tender Offer Sec. Litigation, 455 F. Supp. 999, 1006 (N.D. Ill.
1978).
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at the outset, however, that "defendants are attempting to breathe life
back into the defunct mutuality doctrine in a new guise."1 30 Because
the policy against one-way intervention is in part a disguise for a re-
quirement of mutuality, a court considering whether to allow opting
out parties collateral estoppel rights should not deny those rights
merely on the grounds that one-way intervention would result. It
should deny collateral estoppel where one-way intervention would en-
courage unnecessary claims filed by persons entertaining a wait-and-
see attitude. The test for strong individual interests precludes that wait-
and-see attitude.
Conclusion
At first glance, recent developments in the law of collateral estop-
pel appear to coincide with the policies underlying the opt-out provi-
sion of the amended federal class action rule. From the institutional
perspective of collateral estoppel, those who "could easily have joined"
an action should not be granted preclusive rights in a later suit, sincd
judicial economy is frustrated by such a wait-and-see attitude. Simi-
larly, from the standpoint of Rule 23, those who affirmatively request
exclusion from a suit should not be permitted to reap only the fruits,
not the losses, of that action
Although these two perspectives both normally command the de-
nial of collateral estoppel rights, the policies diverge when the party
opting out possesses strong individual interests. Because the person
with such an individual interest would bring a separate suit irrespective
of his or her possible collateral estoppel rights, judicial economy and
repose are not frustrated, but served, by granting these rights. In this
situation there is no danger that the availability of offensive use of col-
lateral estoppel would discourage joinder of claims and create addi-
tional, vexatious liabilities for the defendant. In terms of fairness to the
party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted, the class suit pro-
vides a particularly compelling judgment from which collateral estop-
pel rights should follow.
The policies underlying the class action rule seem to dictate the
opposite result. In seeking to maximize the binding reach of class ac-
tion judgments, the rulemakers sought to deter class members from
opting out by assuming that the courts would deny them collateral es-
toppel privileges in later suits.131 It also would be unfair if those who
opt out could stand only to gain, while those who remain in the class
suit could risk losing.
Yet the opt-out provision may only define those included in the
130. Id. at 1007.
131. See notes 126-28 & accompanying text sufpra.
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original class judgment; it may not predetermine the collateral estoppel
effect of that judgment. 132 Thus, policies of collateral estoppel need not
be limited by the strictures of amended Rule 23. Moreover, the pur-
poses of the class action rule are not subverted by offensive use of col-
lateral estoppel by persons having a strong individual interest in
controlling their own litigation. The requirements that the opting-out
person file a separate suit and prove that he or she has prosecuted that
suit vigorously would limit the number of persons who could assert
collateral estoppel successfully. The possible stare decisis impact of an
adverse class judgment, the stop-gap measures provided by the class
certification mechanism, and the discretionary power of the later court
all militate against a situation in which all class members would opt out
and sit on the sidelines. The economical value of the class suit thus
would not suffer. Finally, permitting opt-out plaintiffs with strong indi-
vidual interests to assert collateral estoppel would promote uniformity
of decision and the broadest possible binding effect of favorable class
judgments, both aims of amended Rule 23.133
A wealth of literature condemns the modern class action as un-
wieldy, costly, and unfair to the class opponent. 134 Any further advan-
tage given the class by allowing offensive use of collateral estoppel may
be hailed as another aberration of this "Frankenstein monster."' 135 Al-
though these criticisms may be valid, the law of collateral estoppel
should not suffer. It has a substantive life of its own and should not be
manipulated to mend general problems of the class device.
132. See notes 111-12 & accompanying text supra.
133. See note 2 & accompanying text supra.
134. For a summary of recent criticism, see Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining
Knights: Myth, Reality and the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979). For a
summary of legislative responses to class action problems, see Note, Substantive Policies and
Procedural Decisions- An Approach to Certifying Rule 23(b)(3) Antitrust Class Actions, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 491, 532-36 (1979).
135. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, C.J.,
dissenting).
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